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Do States Bargain Over 
Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement? Or, Toward 
Greater Collaboration 
in the Study of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 
Jason Webb Yackee* 
Abstract: In this Symposium Essay I argue that social scientists interested in the 
empirical study of law-related phenomena should take greater advantage of 
opportunities to collaborate with traditionally trained legal experts. Legal experts can 
play a critical role in improving the quality of social scientific understandings and 
operationalizations of law. The legal expert’s role should be considered as substantial and 
important to the research enterprise, as it entails the verification that the social 
scientist’s observations of law meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the theoretical 
concepts of interest. I illustrate my argument by reference to a recent empirical study by 
two political scientists that examines the extent to which states bargain over investor-
state dispute settlement provisions in bilateral investment treaties. 
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I. Introduction 
This symposium essay was originally prepared for a workshop on the “Political Economy 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties” organized by the London School of Economics. It was 
subsequently presented at and refined for the Symposium that produced the papers 
published in this volume of the Santa Clara Journal of International Law.  
The LSE workshop brought together a group of prominent international legal experts, 
political scientists, and economists. The workshop organizers asked participants to “discuss 
research approaches and results, methodological challenges, and possibilities for future 
collaboration” on the empirical study of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The discussion 
at the workshop was fruitful and stimulating, as was the Symposium, and as I’ve reflected 
on the exchanges I’ve come to accept as probably “true” two interrelated impressions.  
First, traditionally trained legal experts interested in the empirical study of BITs 
typically don’t know much about the modern statistical methods of theory-testing and causal 
inference that underlie many social scientific studies of investment treaties. This impression 
is probably not too surprising. As two prominent political scientists pointed out several years 
ago, even self-consciously “empirical” legal academics often violate social scientific norms of 
empirical inquiry.1 Legal experts typically have no formal training in social science methods, 
and there are few professional incentives for them to learn those methods, or to apply them 
in ways recognized as appropriate by the social scientific community. 
But second, and more surprisingly (at least to me), it seems that social scientists 
interested in BIT questions but untrained in law itself often don’t know much about how 
legal experts involved in the BIT community experience and understand the law of BITs. 
That gap between law as viewed by social scientists and law as viewed by legal experts was 
especially evident in discussions of how social scientists had constructed key concepts (such 
as the “strength” of investment treaties), or in how they operationalized those concepts as 
variables in statistical analyses. While statistical tests of social phenomena always require 
the simplification of complex realities into the numerical scales and categories that make 
statistics possible, in some important cases it seemed as if the social scientists had simply 
gotten the law “wrong” in some objective sense. 
If those two impressions are accurate, they are positive in the sense of suggesting that 
lawyers and social scientists enjoy room to collaborate in a fruitful and mutual way. The 
notion that lawyers and social scientists should collaborate is not new, of course. In recent 
years legal academics have been accused, probably with some degree of justification, for 
naively and perhaps negligently ignoring essentially sound and fundamental rules of causal 
inference when making and testing claims about how the world works. Perhaps the most 
well-known and scathing critique is contained in a 2002 article by political scientists Epstein 
 
1. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) (providing a scathing 
critique). 
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and King.2 They argue that virtually all empirical studies in law reviews fundamentally 
violate basic norms of acceptable empirical research and are largely inferentially worthless.3 
While Epstein and King’s critique doesn’t explicitly call on law professors to embrace 
quantitative/statistical research methodologies, their admonitions can be viewed as 
representing a certain kind of “statistical worldview”4 that is today well represented in the 
burgeoning “empirical legal studies” (ELS) movement.5  
It seems supportable to hold that the legal academy is ill suited to autonomously 
producing sophisticated or even high-quality empirical (and especially quantitative) studies 
of law. This is due to such things as a lack of methodological training and, probably less 
importantly, the lack of a peer-review process that might, in theory, prevent poor-quality 
empirical studies of law from being published in the first place.6 One solution that is 
sometimes mentioned is to promote collaboration between social scientists and law 
professors.7 But such calls can seem one-sided, with the benefits of collaboration presumed 
to flow in a single direction—from the methodologically well-trained social scientist to the 
methodologically naïve or illiterate legal scholar.  In this view, the primary aim of 
collaboration seems to be to improve the empirical scholarship of legal academics, and not 
(mutually or instead) to improve the law-related empirical scholarship of non-lawyer social 
scientists. 
 
2. Id. 
3. Id. See also Gregory Mitchell, Essay, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. 
L. REV. 167, 171-172 (2004). 
4. As McKeown has called it, criticizing similar arguments made by King in an earlier book aimed at 
political scientists. Timothy J. McKeown, Case studies and the statistical worldview, 53 INT’L ORG. 
1 (1999). 
5. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 
81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006) (praising empirical legal studies as “arguably the next big thing in 
legal intellectual thought”); Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, And Promise of 
Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713 (2011) 
(describing the history of the empirical legal studies movement). 
6. Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure for Empirical Research in Law, 53 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 311 (2003) (advocating that law reviews incorporate a peer-review process); Elizabeth 
Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal Studies,” 
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 26 (2008) (“most criticism of empirical research by law professors 
is based on quality. . . . Most of this critique is aimed at law reviews and the unique conventions of 
law-review publishing”). Of course, peer-reviewed law reviews would do nothing to encourage or 
enable law professors to produce empirical research of social scientific quality. It would only—in 
theory—prevent “bad” research from being published. 
7. Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the 
Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 367 (1995) (advocating for 
collaboration); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 817-
18 (1999) (suggesting same); Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law 
Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792, 828-829 (1991); Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the 
Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-Realist Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 386 n.129 
(2008). 
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In this essay I suggest that there is, in fact, much to be gained by social scientists from 
collaboration with traditionally trained law professors or lawyers (collectively, “legal 
experts”). Where the social scientist is interested in producing an empirical study about law, 
whether law is taken as a dependent or independent variable, the legal expert can play an 
especially valuable role helping to ensure the validity of the social scientist’s measurements 
of legally related phenomena. This role should be considered as substantial and important to 
the research enterprise, as it entails the verification that the social scientist’s observations of 
law “meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the theoretical concept[s]” of the study.8  
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows. First, in Section 2 I describe in general 
terms the potential contribution of the legal expert to social scientific studies of law and law-
related phenomena. Then, in Section 3, I provide a concrete example of the problem that 
collaboration with legal experts might help mitigate, focusing on a recent social scientific 
study of bilateral investment treaties that contains conceptualizations of international law 
that, in my view, would have benefitted from legal expertise. In Section 4, I draw on legal 
expertise ISDS to suggest three basic legal “facts” about ISDS that might inform a social 
scientific examination of the question of whether and how states bargain over ISDS. Section 
5 then applies those facts to recode the dependent variable of the original social scientific 
study discussed earlier. Section 6 presents a sample statistical analysis demonstrating how 
empirical results are materially sensitive to the recoding exercise. Section 7 provides a brief 
conclusion. 
II. The Potential Contribution of the Legal Expert 
By helping to ensure what we can call “measurement validity”9 the legal expert can 
improve the soundness of the social scientist’s causal inferences, and of the policy 
recommendations that may be derived from those inferences. In the process, he also helps 
build better theories, as good theories depend upon sufficiently “realistic” conceptualizations 
of the underlying phenomena that are to be measured. 
The legal expert does this by helping the social scientist understand the “grammar” of the 
relevant legal community. 10 As law professor Michael Byers has suggested in an essay that 
 
8. Robert Addock & David Collier, Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and 
Quantitative Research, 95 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 529, 530 (2001) (discussing measurement 
validity). 
9. Id. 
10. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). As Fiss argues, 
Rules are not rules unless they are authoritative, and that authority can only be conferred by 
a community. Accordingly, the disciplining rules that govern an interpretive activity must be 
seen as defining or demarcating an interpretive community consisting of those who recognize 
the rules as authoritative. This means, above all else, that the objective quality of 
interpretation is bounded, limited, or relative. It is bounded by the existence of a community 
that recognizes and adheres to the disciplining rules used by the interpreter and that is 
defined by its recognition of those rules. Id. at 745. 
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urges greater collaboration between international law experts and international relations 
theorists, social scientists who study treaties have a history of “mishandling or ignoring . . . 
concepts . . . that . . . appear[] basic to an international lawyer” but that “might seem 
irrelevant or impenetrable to someone from another discipline”.11 The legal expert can help 
to explain the content and relevance of those concepts by drawing on his familiarity with the 
ways in which legal practitioners (and others engaged with the law on a regular basis) view 
the relevant rules and institutions as constraining or providing opportunities for action.  
Put a bit differently, empirical social-scientific studies of law, or that use law, are in a 
very real sense dependent upon the juristic legal conceptions around which members of the 
legal community coordinate their actions.12 To empirically study the law usually means 
borrowing the meaning of law as understood by those who use it on a daily basis. As 
Cotterrell notes, “the intellectual situation seems parallel to that in criminology. ‘Crime’ 
seems to be what the law says it is; ‘law’ seems to be what the state and the lawyers say it 
is.”13  
What Cotterrell has in mind, I think, is the notion that the legal community tends to 
focus or coordinate around particular, shared understandings of what the law “is”, with a 
sort of equilibrium achieved iteratively through the workings and interactions of individual 
legal actors and legal institutions, constrained by the professions’ shared legal culture, 
norms, outlooks, appreciations, and the like.14 The grammar of law is this shared 
understanding (which can also be viewed in a Holmesian sense as a prediction of how other 
members of the legal community will understand the law), where the grammar both 
observes and influences the law.15 
The legal expert’s formal training (which embeds certain skills and attitudes) and his 
repeated social and professional interaction with other members of the legal community, 
 
11. Michael Byers, Response: Taking the Law Out of International Law: A Critique of the 
“Iterative Perspective,” 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 205 (1997) (asserting that international 
relations scholars who study treaties have a history of “mishandling or ignoring . . . concepts . 
. . that . . . appear[] basic to an international lawyer” but that “might seem irrelevant or 
impenetrable to someone from another discipline”). 
12. Roger Cotterrell, Socio-Legal Studies, Law Schools, and Legal and Social Theory, (Queen 
Mary Univ. of London, Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 126, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154404. 
13. Id. at 4. It’s also possible that social science can itself “cause” law, if the legal community 
adopts social scientific arguments as to what the law is, or should be. Cf. Lawrence M. 
Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 777 (1986) (“Legal 
economists have a tendency to claim too much; they are notoriously imperial. . . . On the other 
hand, [their] claim . . . may turn out to be true after all. This will happen if lawyers come to 
believe in the claims, and if judges and administrators actually use economics to solve 
problems.”). Note, however, the determinant position of lawyers here. It is they who decide 
whether a social science understanding of law is transformed into actual law. 
14. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009) (describing law as the solution to a coordination game). 
15. See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Realism Explains Nothing, 1 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 1 (2009) 
(explaining the Holmesian “prediction theory” of law). 
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means that the legal expert is in a potentially strong position to describe (or predict) the 
community’s understanding of what law means or how law works. And because that 
community is responsible for making the law work, their understandings act as law itself. 
This predictive expertise is not easily gained by those outside of the profession, who lack the 
requisite training and the access to (or patience for) the community’s conversations that are 
often necessary for moving beyond simplistic and even wrong understandings of the law—for 
example, law as what the law books say it is (excessive formalism) or law as “politics by 
other means” (excessive cynicism).16 
III. An Example of the Problem 
I’ve suggested above that legal experts embody knowledge about the law (or about legal 
systems, or legal institutions); and that, furthermore, non-law-trained political scientists 
interested in empirically studying legal phenomena may benefit from collaboration with 
legal experts in designing their theories and empirical tests thereof. Let’s turn now to an 
example of the problem through an illustration of what I view as a positive (by which I mean 
good, interesting) example of modern empirical political science/international relations 
scholarship that nonetheless, I think, gets the law “wrong” in a way that detracts from the 
persuasiveness of the article’s underlying theory and findings. The example is drawn from 
the growing body of empirical studies of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
To offer some brief background: The BIT phenomenon has attracted significant 
interdisciplinary and empirical attention, for the obvious reason that there are now roughly 
3,000 signed investment treaties, virtually all of which contain binding state consents to 
investor-initiated arbitration. The result has been an explosion of BIT-based litigation, with 
the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
now having registered nearly as many investor-state arbitrations as the WTO has registered 
trade disputes.17 
Existing empirical studies of BITs can be broken into two basic and distinct lines of 
research. On the one hand, a number of scholars from a variety of academic disciplines have 
examined BITs as independent variables, looking at whether the treaties cause increases in 
foreign direct investment (FDI).18 On the other hand, a somewhat smaller number of 
 
16. Albeit, to be fair, cynicism that is able to predict Supreme Court decisions with significant 
accuracy, if not much theory. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A 
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997) (reviewing and 
critiquing such studies). One of Frank’s critiques is that these studies often contain overly 
simplistic understandings of the “legal model” of judicial decision-making that purely political 
models are often said to disprove. 
17. At the date of writing, the ICSID website lists 449 registered disputes: 175 pending cases and 274 
concluded cases. INT’l CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013). The WTO website lists 434 registered disputes. 
18. The most important empirical BIT studies are cited in Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral 
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scholars, operating primarily within the discipline of political science, have examined BITs 
as dependent variables, attempting to explain such things as why states sign BITs,19 or why 
states sign BITs with particular provisions.20  
I focus here on the second kind of study, a recent article by Professors Allee and 
Peinhardt, both political scientists, that treats international investment law (BITs) as a 
dependent variable. Their article, “Delegated Differences”, appeared in the 2010 volume of 
the respected international relations journal International Studies Quarterly.21 By focusing 
on their article, I do not mean to imply that it is a “bad” article, or that it is for some reason 
especially deserving of criticism. Indeed, I view their empirical work on BITs, including 
“Delegated Differences”, as providing valuable, important contributions to our thinking 
about investment treaties. I focus here on their work simply because it provides a useful and 
unusually clear example of how such work might be further improved through collaboration 
with legal experts. 
In “Delegated Differences”, Alee and Peinhardt are interested in explaining differences in 
the texts of investment treaties. As is standard in political science research, they present 
their empirical study in the context of testing a theory, here of state behavior (whether to 
sign a BIT containing particular text) and based upon on an informal rational choice 
bargaining model.  
In thumbnail form, their theory proceeds as follows. Home and host states both want to 
sign BITs (to protect investors on the one hand, and to promote inward investment on the 
other). But the ideal-typical home and host states have different preferences as to the 
content of the BITs they want to sign. Allee and Peinhardt believe, as do I, that the investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses of BITs are among the most important of the treaty 
provisions (because they make BIT substantive guarantees enforceable, and thus credible), 
and they argue that home-host bargaining will take place around ISDS clauses. In 
particular, home states will want strong ISDS, while host states will want weak ISDS. 
These predictions are based on the assumptions that host states are very concerned about 
sacrificing sovereignty to ISDS tribunals, while home states are very concerned about 
gaining access to ISDS to provide legal protection for their investors.22 
 
Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 
VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011). 
19. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006). 
20. Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2010). 
21. Id. 
22. Incidentally, I am not sure that this bargaining model makes much theoretical sense. If we 
assume that developing countries sincerely desire more investment, and if we assume that they 
are convinced that they need to sign investor-friendly BITs in order to attract that investment—
because investors demand “strong” BITs as a condition to invest—then why would those 
developing states take a bargaining position in favor of “weak” BITs that will not attract 
investment?  
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To operationalize and test their theory, Allee and Peinhardt code the strength of ISDS 
provisions (their dependent variable) by noting the dispute settlement fora to which each 
BIT grants investors access. They also collect a number of independent variables measuring 
concepts related to the strength of home state preferences for strong ISDS, the strength of 
host state preferences for weak ISDS, and the balance of bargaining power between home 
and host states. So, for example, where a home state has a strong preference for strong 
ISDS, a host state has a weak preference for weak ISDS, and the home state enjoys 
significant bargaining power, the model would predict the BIT to contain a strong ISDS 
provision. 
The key to the present discussion is the way in which Allee and Peinhardt conceptualize 
and operationalize ISDS strength. The authors start from the well-supported observation 
that the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) seems to be involved in the vast majority of known BIT arbitrations, and that ICSID 
is plausibly said to enjoy some practical advantages over other arbitral mechanisms, such as 
ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or institutional arbitration 
managed by private organizations like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). For 
example, the ICSID Convention requires signatory states to enforce ICSID awards as if they 
were non-appealable final domestic court judgments. In contrast, awards rendered under an 
UNCITRAL or ICC process are enforced under the New York Convention, which governs the 
international enforceability of international commercial arbitration awards more generally 
and which contains a handful of escape clauses for states that wish to refuse enforcement.  
From these observations about ICSID’s relative importance and its possible advantages 
as an ISDS forum, Allee and Peinhardt make the facially plausible argument that ISDS 
provisions that contain consents to ICSID arbitration are better (from the home state’s and 
investor’s perspective) than are ISDS provisions that do not grant jurisdiction to ICSID. But 
many BITs contain ISDS provisions that consent to ICSID arbitration and to alternatives 
such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph. Other BITs contain consents to ICSID 
alone. Some BITs don’t mention ICSID, but do contain consents to alternative fora. And yet 
other BITs contain no ISDS provisions whatsoever. Allee and Peinhardt propose to rank 
these four possibilities according to the concept of the amount of “delegation” to ICSID.23 
They consider a BIT to contain a “full delegation” of dispute settlement authority to ICSID 
where the treaty’s ISDS clause consents only to ICSID. This is, in their view, the “best” BIT 
(from the home state’s perspective).   
Second best is the BIT that consents to ICSID and to alternative fora. For Allee and 
Peinhardt, this kind of ISDS provision represents a “partial delegation” of decision-making 
authority to ICSID because the investor is free to invoke ICSID’s jurisdiction, or to choose a 
non-ICSID option. Host states that seek to limit the extent of their sacrifice of sovereignty 
 
23. Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 15 (describing their ranking scheme). 
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will, according to this schema, prefer a “partial” rather than a “full” delegation. The 
delegation is “partial” because ”multiple options for dispute settlement opens the door to 
delay and removes the efficiency gains associated with exclusive delegation to ICSID.”24 And 
finally, BITs that fail to contain any delegation to ICSID are the weakest. This category 
seems to include both those BITs that consent to ICC or UNCITRAL arbitration (but not 
ICSID) as well as those BITs that fail to contain effective, comprehensive ISDS clauses.25 
Table 1, below, contains a summary of my understanding of their rank ordering scheme. 
 
Table 1: Allee & Peinhardt’s Dependent Variable: Concept & 
Operationalization 
Rank Order 
(Higher=Better) 
Concept Operationalization 
2 Full ICSID 
delegation 
Only ICSID 
arbitration 
1 Partial ICSID 
delegation 
ICSID + UNICTRAL 
&/or other arbitration 
0 No delegation to 
ICSID, but 
delegation to 
something else 
UNCITRAL &/or other 
arbitration 
0 No delegation to 
anything 
No ISDS 
 
The authors test their theory statistically.  They find that a number of their independent 
variables are statistically significant and signed in the predicted direction. For example, 
home states that have strong interests in a “full” delegation to ICSID are more likely to 
enter into BITs with higher-ranked ISDS provisions. Host states that have a greater interest 
in or need for FDI (measured by such things as their reliance on foreign aid) are also more 
likely to consent to stronger ISDS provisions. Allee and Peinhardt conclude that for home 
and host states, “the decision to delegate dispute settlement authority to ICSID has been an 
important one.”26 
 
24. Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 7. 
25. I say “seems” because Allee and Peinhardt do not expressly talk about the possibility of BITs that 
fail to contain ISDS provisions. Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20. 
26. Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 24. 
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IV. The Contribution of Legal Expertise 
We can now begin to imagine how an expert in the law and practice of BITs, even one 
with little or no statistical training, might have contributed meaningfully to the analysis, 
making it potentially more realistic, or, at least, potentially more convincing to those 
members of the relevant legal community.27 I organize the discussion around three basic 
observations about IIL that I think are likely to be shared by most legal experts working in 
the area but that are not necessarily obvious to non-legal experts: the value of ISDS of any 
kind, the importance of context, and the use of model clauses.  
A. The Value of ISDS of Any Kind 
Let’s start at the bottom of Table 1. Lawyers are trained to appreciate that rights 
unaccompanied by remedies are often of dubious value to the rights-holder. In that vein, and 
as I have argued elsewhere, BITs that contain no ISDS provisions are probably of very little 
theoretical or practical value as host state credible commitment devices.28 A BIT that 
promises investors favorable substantive treatment, in vague terms, but that doesn’t give 
the investor the right to access international arbitration to interpret and apply those terms 
in an authoritative and enforceable way offers foreign investors little to no international 
legal protection against opportunistic host state behavior. From that perspective, equating 
BITs with no ISDS with BITs that provide access to non-ICSID ISDS is problematic. This is 
especially so because arbitral alternatives to ICSID (pure ad hoc arbitration, non-
institutional arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, institutional arbitration under the 
ICC) have historically proven to be a valuable addition to the foreign investor’s legal arsenal. 
Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s ad hoc contract-based arbitration produced numerous 
important awards supporting the international legal principles of pacta sunt servanda and of 
meaningful compensation in the event of expropriation.29 As a starting point, the legal 
expert would probably suggest that BITs with no ISDS are likely to be significantly worse 
for investors than are BITs with an ISDS provision consenting to ad hoc or any other kind of 
arbitration. 
 
27. It is always possible for political scientists to refuse to care whether lawyers think their law-
related theories and findings are persuasive or not. But where we are interested in explaining how 
states as collective abstracts understand and experience law, it seems to me pretty relevant to 
have an accurate understanding of how the lawyers who advise and constitute the state see the 
law; their lawyer’s view of the law becomes the state’s view, in a sense. To not care about their 
views is to devalue realism as something that political science theories should reflect. I suppose 
that this devaluation may be acceptable, depending on one’s view of what the point of the research 
enterprise is. 
28.  Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 33 BROOKLYN INT’L L. J. 405, 427 (2008). 
29. Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors before Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1550, 1551 (2009). 
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B. The Importance of Options 
Move up Table 1, to the distinction between “partial” and “full” ICSID delegations. 
Lawyers are trained to be sensitive to the importance of options, as the best choice will often 
depend upon particular contexts and “facts on the ground” that are difficult to predict ex 
ante. In the world of ISDS, it is possibly true that ICSID arbitration will be the preferred 
arbitral mechanism for most investors. But it is not necessarily the preferred arbitral 
mechanism for all investors. This is because context matters. ICSID represents a particular 
matrix of trade-offs, and before ranking the desirability of different arbitral options we need 
to understand what the arbitral consumer’s preferences actually are. For example, while 
investment-treaty awards are arguably more readily enforced under ICSID than under the 
New York Convention—itself an empirically undemonstrated fact—ICSID arbitrations are 
also typically subject to greater demands of “transparency”, including the now-mandatory 
publication of excerpts of decisions. The investor who wishes his dispute to stand a good 
chance of remaining confidential might reasonably prefer UNCITRAL to ICSID.  
ICSID arbitration involves other tradeoffs as well. For example, ICSID arbitrations are 
subject to an annulment process that allows a limited right to appeal. UNCITRAL 
arbitrations are not subject to annulment. While the New York Convention provides a 
limited number of grounds upon which a state might refuse enforcement of an award, such 
refusals don’t extinguish the ability of the investor to seek enforcement in another 
jurisdiction. Whether ICSID annulment review is supposed to be searching or lenient is a 
matter of some debate in the academic literature, as annulment committees flip-flop 
between showing significant deference to lower tribunal awards and showing very little. An 
investor that favors the finality of awards over their legal correctness might prefer 
UNCITRAL or ICC arbitration, neither of which is subject to annulment.30 
Even if we accept that ICSID provides high-quality decisions, that quality comes at a 
price. Literally. The average cost of an ICSID arbitration (including lawyer’s fees) for a party 
is quite high.31 And it takes, on average, three to four years, for an ICSID arbitration to 
wend its way through the ICSID process, not including the time taken up by potential 
annulment proceedings.32 Arbitral alternatives may be both cheaper and quicker than 
 
30. Piero Bernardini, ICSID versus non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM 
BERNARDO CREMADES 44 (describing ICSID’s annulment process as a disadvantage compared to 
alternative arbitral fora). 
31. A recent OECD study suggests that average cost to the parties for an investor-state dispute is 
$8,000,000. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-state dispute settlement: A scoping 
paper for the investment policy community 18 (OECD, Working Paper No. 2012/3, 2012). The 
OECD study does not provide separate cost estimates for ICSID versus non-ICSID arbitration. My 
suggestion in the essay that non-ICSID arbitration may be cheaper is conjectural. 
32. Anthony Sinclair, Louise Fisher & Sarah Macrory ICSID arbitration: how long does it take?, 4 
GLOBAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (2009), available at 
http://www.goldreserveinc.com/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%20%20How%20long%20does%2
0it%20take.pdf. 
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ICSID, potentially decisive criteria for aggrieved investors who don’t enjoy a significant legal 
war chest of money or time.33 
The viability of a BIT-based consent to ICSID also depends on the willingness of the host 
state to remain a party to the ICSID Convention. A host state that withdraws from the 
Convention (as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have recently done) makes an investor’s 
access to ICSID via a BIT-based consent uncertain at best.34  Investors that are particularly 
worried about the possibility of denunciation would greatly welcome the availability of 
alternative fora, the investor’s access to which cannot be defeated by unilateral state action 
since there is no institution from which formal withdrawal is possible. 
In other words, from a legal perspective it probably doesn’t make much sense to suggest 
that fewer options are necessarily better than more options, especially when the “more 
options” category contains all of the options residing in the “fewer options” category.35 An 
ISDS clause that provides for ICSID arbitration, and only for ICSID arbitration, may be 
perfectly fine for most investors. It’s a belt that suffices to hold up most pairs of pants. But 
some investors will find themselves in a situation in which they rationally prefer suspenders 
to belts, or they discover that their belt has burst. Giving investors the option of wearing 
suspenders—if they wish—hardly detracts from their preference for wearing belts in most 
cases. 
Another way of looking at the issue of whether less is better than more is through the 
concept of “delegation.” When lawyers write arbitration clauses in ordinary international 
commercial contracts, they recognize that they are removing dispute-settlement authority 
from state authorities (presumed biased against the foreign party), and delegating it to 
private actors. In the drafting exercise, one consideration is or should be the scope of the 
delegation. But that consideration is not one of whether the delegation is to multiple arbitral 
fora. It is whether to circumscribe the subject matter over which the arbitral forum is 
entitled to rule. A broad (or “full”) delegation would include language such as “All disputes 
arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally and exclusively 
settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.” If a party 
wants to limit the scope of delegation, it will replace the words “all disputes” with a more 
 
33. Bernardini, supra note 30, at 43, makes a similar point, noting that “delay” is a “critical” (e.g. 
undesirable) aspect of ICSID arbitration compared to ICSID alternatives. 
34. An important and contested legal issue is whether a state’s withdrawal under ICSID Convention 
Article 71 extinguishes a state’s consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction that reside in BITs that 
themselves haven’t yet been denounced—or that have been denounced but which remain in effect 
as to covered investments through BIT-based continuation-of-coverage clauses. See Ignacio A. 
Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 409, 429-430 
(2010) (discussing some of the legal uncertainties related to withdrawal from ICSID). 
35. As a recent treatise on Chinese BITs notes, “The best position for an investor with regard to 
dispute resolution is to have as many options as possible for international arbitration.” NORAH 
GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE 377 
(2009). 
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limiting phrase. Perhaps “all disputes relating to the quality of the delivered goods”. Or “all 
disputes relating to the interpretation of this contract”. 
In the IIL context, state parties have similar opportunities to limit the subject-matter 
scope of their delegations to ICSID or other fora. They may, for example, define the concept 
of “investment” as used in their BITs narrowly rather than broadly. ICSID’s jurisdiction is 
limited to “investments” under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, and ICSID tribunals will 
typically look at how the state parties to a BIT have defined investment in their investment 
treaties. A state might also expressly exclude certain classes of disputes, such as disputes 
over tax matters, as does Article 21 of the 2004 Model U.S. BIT. Or it may wish to maintain 
its sovereignty to implement prudential financial regulations, as provided in Article 20 of the 
2004 U.S. model. Or it may wish to carve out an exception for decisions related to whether a 
treaty violation was necessary to protect the host state’s essential security interests, as in 
Article 18 of the same model treaty. As yet another example, BITs involving Communist 
countries traditionally limited their ISDS provisions to disputes over the treaty’s 
expropriation provision, excluding disputes over the meaning of other treaty provisions, like 
the guarantee of “fair and equitable treatment”. States may also use the ICSID Convention 
itself to limit the subject-matter scope of their delegations. Article 25(4) of the Convention 
allows states to notify ICSID as to the kinds of disputes that they do not wish to submit to 
ICSID jurisdiction, as Ecuador recently did. 
The point is that there are more natural ways for states to limit the scope of delegations 
to ICSID than to decide whether to give investors the option of choosing ICSID or some 
arbitral alternative. In legal terms, a “full” delegation to ICSID is one in which an investor 
may submit more or less any investment dispute to ICSID, if the investor wishes to do so. A 
“partial” delegation is one in which the investor’s right to access ICSID, or any other arbitral 
fora, is meaningfully limited to only particular legal questions or particular kinds of 
disputes.  
C. A Note on the Use of Model Clauses  
Contract drafting decisions may be profoundly influenced by the use of model forms and 
clauses, which are often plugged into contract documents in a rather mechanical and 
unreflective way.36  Even where there is some measure of bargaining over the inclusion or 
exclusion of a particular kind of clause, there may be no bargaining about the actual text of 
the clause that ends up being included, the model text taken as a given. There may not even 
be much bargaining about the inclusion of the clause in the model form at all.  
BIT negotiations are no stranger to the phenomenon of the model clause. Most capital 
exporting states develop model investment treaties that serve as the beginning, and perhaps 
 
36. See generally Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese”, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 
(2001). 
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more or less the end, of most BIT negotiations. ISDS clauses are themselves “modeled” 
within model BITs. So, for example, the Swiss model in effect in the mid-1990s contains an 
ISDS clause that provides ICSID as the only ISDS option.37 The United Kingdom model 
from the same period contains “alternative” ISDS clauses, from which the negotiating 
partner might choose. The first names only ICSID; the second possible clause names ICSID, 
ICC, and UNICTRAL arbitration.38 The 1991 German model also contains alternative ISDS 
clauses, the first specifying only ICSID, the second specifying only ad hoc arbitration. The 
United States’ 1994 and 2004 models contain just one ISDS clause, providing access to 
ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. Model BITs by capital importing states are more 
unusual, but not unheard of. For example, Chile developed a model BIT in 1994 that 
contains an ICSID-only ISDS clause. 
This is not to deny that in some cases the decision to include any ISDS clause has been 
controversial. Australia, for example, insisted that the United States delete ISDS from the 
investment chapter of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement.39 Some host states may also 
insist on marginally weakening model ISDS text by, for example, requiring longer waiting 
periods between a dispute’s crystallization and the investor’s right to access arbitration.40 
Leaked texts from ongoing negotiations between the European Union and Canada also 
illustrate significant if often highly technical debates over the ISDS. ISDS can be 
controversial, and states can, and sometimes do, specifically negotiate over it. 
The question is whether there is meaningful and regular bargaining over ISDS content 
amongst the rank-ordered dimension identified by Allee and Peinhardt.41 In that regard, the 
variation in model treaty practice discussed above poses some interesting apparent 
anomalies. For example, why would we expect Switzerland, a small and relatively weak 
capital-exporting state, to embed in its model a “full” delegation to ICSID (e.g. ICSID-only 
arbitration), while the United States, certainly the materially most powerful capital-
exporting country over the period of study, would handicap its initial bargaining position by 
putting forward a weaker “partial” model clause? Such puzzlers pose a challenge to the 
notion that less is more, at least as far as ISDS is concerned. They also may pose deeper 
challenges to a “rationalist” account of investment treaty design, as the observed differences 
 
37. The Swiss model is reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990’S 273 (1998). 
38. Id. at 279. 
39. As described in Ann Capling & Kim Richard Nossal, Blowback: Investor-State Dispute 
Mechanisms in International Trade Agreements, 19 GOVERNANCE 151, 152 (2006).  
40. An example, cited by Allee and Peinhardt, is the 1985 BIT between the US and Turkey. Turkey 
inserted a one-year waiting period in the ISDS, among other changes from the US model. The BIT 
nonetheless gives the investor the right to access ICSID arbitration. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra 
note 20, at 5. In contrast, the BIT with the Democratic Republic of Congo, signed around the same 
time, contains a waiting period of six months. An extra six months of waiting is “marginal” in light 
of the length of time it takes for the typical ICSID dispute to work through the ICSID system (a 
matter of years).  
41. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 14-20.  
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in model ISDS practice don’t on their face seem to reflect the sorts of considerations, or 
understandings of interest, that Allee and Peinhardt’s theory suggests.42 
V. Putting the Legal Expert’s Input Into Action 
In this section I present a reconstruction of Allee and Peinhardt’s dependent variable that 
reflects the first two points of legal expertise presented in the previous section (the value of 
any kind of ISDS and the importance of context).43 For the purposes of this reconstruction, I 
set aside the third point made above, concerning the use and content of model clauses. The 
first two points can readily be used to suggest a recoding of their data without disturbing the 
overarching bargaining-theory framework in which their empirical analysis takes place. The 
third point uses legal expertise to suggest the desirability of a more fundamental re-thinking 
of Allee and Peinhardt’s larger enterprise by calling into question the ways in which they 
conceptualize states’ interests and bargaining as to the details of ISDS. Operationalizing the 
third point would require a new theory, perhaps incorporating or building upon the “data” of 
model treaty text, of what aspects of ISDS states might predictably bargain over. Such a 
theory is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
Table 2, below, illustrates the reconstruction. I think that most experts in the field of IIL 
would probably consider this view to be more intuitively plausible, or “valid,” than the view 
provided in Table 1. Of course, that assertion itself should, in the best of all possible worlds, 
be subject to empirical verification via scientific methods. I have not scientifically surveyed 
IIL experts, and my sense of what the IIL community thinks about these issues is 
admittedly informal and unproven. 
What are the main differences between the two Tables? First, I would consider an ISDS 
clause that grants the investor access to both ICSID and other fora to be qualitatively better, 
from the investor’s perspective, than one that grants access only to ICSID. Let’s rank those 
clauses as “2,” or highest/best. Second, it is perhaps arguable that an ICSID-only clause is 
better than a clause that provides only non-ICSID options, like UNICTRAL or ICC 
arbitration. I say “perhaps arguable” because the case that ICSID is necessarily and 
significantly better than the leading alternatives is not so clear, and IIL experts might view 
these two treaties as roughly exchangeable.44 Finally, I think that most if not all IIL lawyers 
would view BITs that contain no ISDS clause (or that limit its scope of application to a very 
narrow subset of disputes) as significantly inferior to all others, and perhaps even 
conceptually irrelevant, depending on the aims of the particular study.45 
 
42. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 9-14. 
43. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 13-14. 
44. See, e.g., Bernardini, supra note 30, at 90-92. 
45. For example, a study might attempt to explain why states include any consent to ISDS in their 
BITs. In that case, it would be very relevant to include observations of BITs that do not contain 
ISDS, and observations that do. The practical problem is that virtually all BITs from the past 20 
 Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? 
293 
 
Table 2: An alternative conceptualization 
Rank Order 
(Higher=Better) 
Concept Operationalization 
2 Multiple fora 
(including ICSID) 
ICSID + other for a 
1 ICSID only ICSID arbitration 
0 Single or multiple 
fora (No ICSID) 
UNCITRAL &/or ICC 
arbitration 
. (Should  probably 
be excluded from 
analysis) 
No fora No investor-state 
arbitration 
 
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, we can see that the incorporation of legal expertise can 
lead to very different coding decisions for particular observations. For example, the “best” 
treaty in Table 1 (a BIT containing only a delegation to ICSID alone) is, in Table 2, 
recorded as second best. And conversely, what is second best in Table 1 becomes the best 
in Table 2. 
VI. A Statistical Example 
In this section I demonstrate empirically what should be pretty intuitive: recoding a 
dependent variable along the lines that I have done above can, and normally should, 
dramatically change the results of the statistical analysis. I present results from what I call 
a “reconsideration” of Allee and Peinhardt’s original model. I should caution that what I 
present is not a narrowly construed “replication.” I use a different sample and different 
variables, and I rely on my own coding of ISDS clause.46 
I should also emphasize that the point of this statistical exercise is really not to present 
and defend (or to disprove or falsify) a theoretically informed model of state bargaining over 
 
years contain ISDS provisions, leaving no variation on the dependent variable. 
46. My distinction between replication and reconsideration roughly tracks follows the distinction 
between “verification” and “reanalysis” discussed in Paul S. Herrnson, Replication, Verification, 
Secondary Analysis, and Data Collection in Political Science, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 452, 452 
(1995):  
Replication is not the same as reanalysis, verification, or secondary analysis. The four 
terms have very different meanings. A reanalysis studies the same problem as that 
investigated by the initial investigator; the same data base as that used by the initial 
investigator may or may not be used. If different, independently collected data are used 
to study the same problem, the reanalysis is called a replication. If the same data are 
used, the reanalysis is called a verification. In a secondary analysis, data collected to 
study one set of problems are used to study a different problem. Secondary analysis 
frequently, but not necessarily, depends on the use of multipurpose datasets. 
12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 277 (2013) 
294 
BITs. My model is derived from my understanding of Allee and Peinhardt’s original theory, 
but it is not precisely the same model, and it does not use the same data. For that reason, 
and in part because I am not sure the underlying bargaining theory is all that persuasive to 
begin with (a discussion beyond the scope of this essay), I am not particularly interested in 
the substantive results for specific variables in the reconsidered analysis.  
Following Allee and Peinhardt, my analysis takes the form of a panel regression. It 
should be immediately obvious that this is the kind of research activity that most law 
professors are not well-trained, or trained at all, to do. By presenting a statistical analysis, I 
do not mean to undermine the point of the preceding sections, and the main point of this 
article—that non-statistically-trained law professors will often be able to contribute 
meaningfully to statistical social scientific studies of law. I am able to present such a study 
because I am fortunate to have received graduate-level training in both law and political 
science. But I do not claim that such interdisciplinary training is necessary to render the 
typical law professor useful to the social scientific enterprise. Interdisciplinary training can 
be valuable, but it also has important costs—namely, the need for the researcher to complete 
two separate, intensive courses of graduate study. Furthermore, and as a prominent law 
professor told me at the beginning of my career, “you have to be disciplinary before you can 
be interdisciplinary.” Being “disciplinary” is hard work; it is even harder to master and keep 
up with two sets of literatures, research norms, and techniques. The typical 
“interdisciplinary” scholar will often be stronger in one discipline than the other, sometimes 
markedly so. This is why collaboration between disciplinarians, rather than the creation of 
an army of socio-legal polymaths, is the more realistic solution to the problem of “poor” 
empirical legal research. 
To conduct my analysis, I coded two aspects of the dispute-settlement provisions of all 
publicly available BITs between 18 top capital-exporting states and their treaty partners.47 
The first aspect was the focus of my early empirical studies on the question of whether BITs 
promote foreign investment. My coding scheme records whether the particular BIT 
guarantees the investor access to investor-initiated international arbitration for a wide 
variety of treaty-related disputes with the host state.48 
The second aspect is the main the focus of this paper: if the BIT contains that kind of 
effective, comprehensive arbitration clause, which arbitral fora is the investor authorized to 
access? This latter data collection effort mirrors Allee and Peinhardt’s own efforts. Like 
them, I find significant variation. Some BITs grant access to ICSID alone, some to ICSID 
and other fora, and some to other fora but not to ICSID. 
 
47. (1) Australia (2) Austria (3) Belgium (4) Canada (5) Denmark (6) Finland (7) France (8) Germany 
(9) Great Britain (10) Italy (11) Japan (12) Netherlands (13) Norway (14) Singapore (15) Spain 
(16) Sweden (17) Switzerland (18) USA. 
48. I have called these ISDS provisions “comprehensive” in my earlier papers. 
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I recorded whether each BIT contained an effective, comprehensive ISDS provision 
naming any of the following arbitral fora: ICSID; UNCITRAL; ICC; Swedish Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC); non-UNCITRAL (or pure) ad hoc; the ICSID Additional Facility; and 
“other.”  For this symposium essay, I then created two versions of a dependent variable. The 
first reflects Table 1, above, and is an analogue, I think, to Allee and Peinhardt’s dependent 
variable; the second reflects Table 2. In both cases, I have excluded BITs that do not contain 
an effective, comprehensive ISDS clause.49  
For the Table 1 version, I have coded BITs that consent to non-ICSID arbitration as “0;” 
BITs that consent to ICSID arbitration and at least one other forum as “1,” and BITs that 
consent to only ICSID arbitration as “2.” 
For the Table 2 version, I have coded BITs that consent to non-ICSID arbitration as “0;” 
BITs that consent to only ICSID as “1;” and BITs that consent to ICSID and at least one 
other forum as “2.” As suggested earlier in this essay, one could also plausibly collapse Table 
2’s “0” and “1” categories, as it is not at all clear that ICSID arbitration is viewed by states or 
investors as necessarily and materially superior to non-ICSID arbitration. 
In both versions of the DV, I elected to count a consent to the ICSID Additional Facility 
(AF) as distinct from a consent to ICSID. The AF was created administratively (and not by 
international treaty) to allow ICSID to arbitrate disputes involving a state party who is not a 
party to the ICSID Convention itself. Importantly, AF proceedings are expressly not subject 
to the ICSID Convention, which itself is the source of some of the main purported benefits of 
ICSID arbitration. AF proceedings should probably then be viewed as inferior to ICSID 
proceedings—or at least not quite equivalent. 
Another difficulty is that some BITs contain ISDS clauses that appear to give the investor 
multiple options, but in reality provide mutually exclusive options. For example, many 
Australian BITs grant access to UNCITRAL arbitration, but only as long as either one or 
both of the states are not members of the ICSID Convention. If both states are ICSID 
members, then the UNCITRAL option disappears, and ICSID arbitration becomes the only 
possibility.50 Complex ISDS provisions like these are rare, however, and I have elected to 
treat them as if they contain consents to ICSID and other fora (e.g. a “1” in Table 1’s scheme, 
and a “2” in Table 2’s scheme). 
 
49. So, for example, BITs that do not give the investor any right to arbitration are not included in my 
analysis. I also exclude BITs with “promissory” or “partial” ISDS clauses, as those terms are used 
in my earlier studies. “Partial” ISDS clauses are were overwhelmingly entered into by Soviet-era 
Communist countries and limited the scope of the states’ consent to arbitration to a narrowly 
defined class of disputes. Since the collapse of the USSR BITs with partial ISDS clauses are 
exceedingly rare.  
50. ISDS clauses that consent to both ICSID arbitration and to the Additional Facility are similar to 
Australia’s either-or ISDS clause in the sense that if both the home and host state are members of 
the ICSID Convention, arbitration under the AF rules becomes impossible. 
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Following Allee and Peinhardt, I include a selection of independent variables. Here, my 
aim was to build a model that is roughly analogous to theirs, by using readily available data 
that reflects their basic bargaining theory as I understand it. The model is intended to 
provide the structure in which we can examine the sensitivity of statistical results to 
changes in the coding of the DV. My intent here is not to test whether Allee and Peinhardt’s 
theory is confirmed or disproved, nor am I interested in the results (as mentioned above). 
However, it is probably worth discussing in a bit of detail the construction of each of the 
variables, and their theoretical purposes. In the discussion of the model results, further 
below, I will also briefly mention the theoretical implications of the results, even if I view 
these results—as opposed to their sensitivity—as being of relatively minor interest here.  
Four variables tap the home state’s ISDS preferences, as elaborated by Allee and 
Peinhardt: 
(1) A measure of home state’s FDI outflows as a percent of home state’s GDP. This 
variable reflects Allee and Peinhardt’s argument that home states with a large 
number of corporations engaged in FDI will face stronger domestic political 
pressure to negotiate strong ISDS provisions. This measure comes from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).51 The WDI dataset does not 
contain FDI outflow data for Belgium, so Belgium is excluded from my empirical 
analysis. 
(2) A dummy variable indicating whether the host state was a post-World War II 
colony of the home state. Allee and Peinhardt argue that ex-colonial masters will 
have an incentive to be more lenient in ISDS negotiations with their ex-colonies. 
It should be pointed out, however, that outside of Great Britain and France, 
none of the home states in my sample had significant post-war colonial 
empires.52 
(3) The durability of the host state’s Polity IV (democracy) rating. The durability 
indicator measures the number of years since a major change in the state’s 
Polity rating. Allee and Peinhardt suggest that home states will view more 
durable regimes as less likely to take actions harmful to investors, and will thus 
be less likely to insist on strong ISDS. The Polity measure of democracy is 
widely used in political science. 
 
51. Allee and Peinhardt also include measures of the home country’s embrace of “rule of law” 
principles, but their rule of law variable is insignificant in their analyses. I have elected not to 
include such a variable here, as the capital exporting countries in my sample have uniformly high 
rule of law scores; the values of the scores vary very little year-to-year; and rule of law data has 
been collected by the World Bank only since 1996. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 19. 
52. There is indeed some evidence that colonial status can influence BIT practice, though not quite in 
the way suggested by Allee and Peinhardt. France, for example, had a policy of refusing to enter 
into BITs with those of its ex-colonies who were part of the CFA monetary regime. Patrick 
Juillard, Les conventions bilaterales d'investissement concludes par la France [Bilateral 
Investment Conventions Concluded by France], 106 J. DROIT INT'L 274, 282-83 (1979).  
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(4) The host state’s Polity IV democracy rating. More democratic countries may be 
viewed as having stronger preferences for the rule of law, or as having greater 
ability to credibly commit to treating investors favorably. Allee and Peinhardt 
argue that home states will see less need to insist on strong ISDS when a host 
state respects the rule of law. 
I include two variables arguably tapping the host state’s ISDS preferences: 
(5) The host state’s GDP growth rate, taken from the WDI. Allee and Peinhardt 
argue that host states that are experiencing strong economic performance will 
have fewer incentives to agree to a strong ISDS clause (because they will have 
less objective need for the additional FDI that a strong ISDS clause might 
promote). 
(6) A dummy variable indicating whether the host state has any outstanding loans 
(credits) from the World Bank, taken from the WDI. Allee and Peinhardt suggest 
that host states in debt to the World Bank will be more likely to accept strong 
ISDS clauses. 
Allee and Peinhardt argue that if home states generally prefer strong ISDS, and host 
states generally prefer weak ISDS, then the outcome of a bargaining situation over ISDS 
strength should depend on the parties’ relative bargaining power. Like them, I include: 
(7) A measure of the difference between the home state’s and the host state’s GDP, 
from the WDI. 
Finally, I also include: 
(8) A dummy variable indicating whether the host state has signed the ICSID 
Convention prior to signing the particular BIT. The dummy reflects the fact that 
a BIT-based consent to ICSID is ineffective, absent a state’s membership in 
ICSID. I suspect that where the host state has not signed the ICSID Convention, 
the home state will be more likely to include a non-ICSID option in the ISDS. 
(9) A year counter to control for the probability that ISDS- or BIT-drafting practices 
evolve over time. We see clear evidence of such evolution over the long term, as 
initially BITs never or rarely included ISDS, while today BITs almost always 
contain ISDS. 
Because BITs did not contain ISDS provisions prior to the 1970s (and did not regularly 
include ISDS until the mid 1980s), I begin my analysis in 1970. I collected ISDS data up 
through 2002. All variable values are for the year of BIT signature. 
I estimate the model using ordered probit, with robust standard errors (clustered around 
home countries).53  Clustering around home countries helps control for the possibility that 
there are specific home-country differences in ISDS preferences or negotiating behavior. 
More concretely, we can think of clustering as controlling for the fact that home countries 
 
53. The regressions were performed using the -oprobit- command in Stata 12.  
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base their negotiations on very different model ISDS clauses. Table 3 provides results for the 
Allee and Peinhardt version of the dependent variable. Table 4 provides results for the 
reconsidered dependent variable. 
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Table 3: Determinants of ISDS Strength, Allee & Peinhardt Construction of Dependent 
Variable (ICSID-only As Best) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Determinants of ISDS Strength, Reconsidered Construction of Dependent 
Variable (ICSID + Alternatives As Best) 
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First look at Table 3. The first four variables, all in theory measuring home state 
preferences for strong ISDS, are statistically insignificant. Of the two variables arguably 
measuring host state preferences, only Host GDP Growth is significant, but it is wrongly 
signed. The positive coefficient suggests that better-performing host states are more likely to 
accept strong ISDS clauses, in apparent tension with Allee and Peinhardt’s theory. Finally, 
note that the two variables I’ve added—whether the host state had signed the ICSID 
Convention prior to signing the BIT, and the year counter, are both highly statistically 
significant. Host states that have not signed the ICSID Convention are less likely to accept 
strong ISDS (where strong means “only ICSID”, as Allee and Peinhardt argue), and, over 
time, ISDS provisions have become weaker.54 
Now examine Table 4. Given my re-conceptualization and re-operationalization of the 
dependent variable, it’s not surprising to find that the statistical results are quite different, 
both in terms of significance and sign. Indeed, illustrating this sensitivity is the main point 
of my statistical reconsideration. Three of the four “home state” variables are now significant 
at the <.10 level, but their coefficients tell a conflicting story. The negative sign on Home 
FDI Outflows suggest that home states with more outward foreign investment demand 
weaker rather than stronger ISDS, while the positive sign for the host Polity variable 
suggests that home states demand stronger ISDS from more-democratic host states. Both 
suggestions seem in conflict with Allee and Peinhardt’s theory. On the other hand, the 
results for the Host Colony variable support their predictions. Home states seem more likely 
to enter into BITs with weaker ISDS provisions when the bargaining partner is an ex-
colony, though recall that the only two home countries with significant ex-colonial empires 
here are Britain and France. As to the two host-state variables, the IBRD credits variable is 
significant—though Host GDP Growth no longer is—but it is wrongly signed from the 
perspective of Allee and Peinhardt’s theory. Finally, note that the sign has switched on the 
year counter, which remains highly significant. Now, BITs become stronger with time. 
VII. Conclusion 
Traditionally trained legal experts may believe that they are unable to evaluate or 
contribute to statistical analyses of legal phenomena because they don’t understand the 
underlying statistical theory or mathematical operations. Statistics can mystify, and 
mystification means that the mystified object must be accepted or rejected as a matter of 
faith rather than as a result of careful, reasoned legal analysis. But as I suggest in this 
Essay, legal experts need not be trained in the latest statistical methods to play a 
meaningful and constructive role in empirical debates about legal phenomena. That role can 
be critical, but it can also be collaborative. Working with the non-lawyer social scientist, the 
legal expert—whether serving as co-author, or consultant, or even peer-reviewer—can use 
 
54. Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 4-6. 
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his legal expertise (his informally empirical sense of how the law really works) to evaluate 
and to suggest improvements in the ways in which methodologically sophisticated social 
scientists translate legal phenomena into the numerical categories and values that make 
statistical analysis possible. The result, hopefully, will be more conceptually sound, accurate 
studies of legal phenomena that nonetheless provide persuasive empirical support for useful 
theories.  
 
  
